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This is the handout for an invited commentary on Richmond H. Thomason,
Matthew Stone, and David DeVault, “Enlightened Update: A Computational
Architecture for Presupposition and Other Pragmatic Phenomena.” It was
presented at the OSU Accommodation Workshop, October 13, 2006.
Planning architecture
(1) c →
c′′
ˆ c
c′′′
Z(c)
c shared discourse state
ˆ c obtained from c by covert actions of speaker
Z(c) Set of states (horizon) obtainable from c by possible covert actions of speaker
(2) a. Z(c) represents the hearer’s uncertainty about the covert actions per-
formed by the speaker
b. Enlightened update is a feature of planned, structured communica-
tion: the hearer identiﬁes (aspects of) the covert state of the speaker
which are not directly represented in utterance semantics.
c. The speaker plans an utterance which will allow the hearer to recover
ˆ c from Z(c).
d. Speaker and hearer evaluate competing discourse structures in an ab-
ductive architecture. Enlightened update is possible in part because
they do this in the same (or similar) ways.
Coref example
(3) Following page, reproduced from Thomason et. al.
(4) a. Step 7 explicitly gives a predication “solid” on the current collabo-
rative referent.
b. Implicitly, the clariﬁcation dialogue about property referred to by
“light brown” is ended.
c. The subtopic is also a collabref dialogue, and there is a competing
discourse structure in which it’s solid continues the embedded topic.
d. In this case, the hearer is able to ﬁgure out that the speaker intends
to end the subtopic. This is a feature of ˆ c, and not of the common
ground c.
1Utterance Task Moves Resulting Task State
Task Stack Facts
ClarkGame
square(a)
solid(a)
sandybrown(a)
C: This one is a
square.
(tacit) Push(Collabref(
￿
￿))
addcr(
￿
￿,square(
￿
￿))
CollabRef(
￿
￿)
ClarkGame
square(a)
solid(a)
sandybrown(a)
square(
￿
￿)
U: Um-hm. ack
CollabRef(
￿
￿)
ClarkGame
square(a)
solid(a)
sandybrown(a)
square(
￿
￿)
C: It’s light
brown.
addcr(
￿
￿,sandybrown(
￿
￿))
CollabRef(
￿
￿)
ClarkGame
square(a)
solid(a)
sandybrown(a)
square(
￿
￿)
sandybrown(
￿
￿)
U: You mean like
tan?
(tacit) Downdate(
￿
￿)
(tacit) Push(Clarify(C
￿,
￿
￿))
(tacit) Push(CollabRef(
￿
￿))
(tacit) Push(YNQ)
ynq(addcr(
￿
￿,
￿
￿ sandybrown))
YNQ
CollabRef(
￿
￿)
Clarify(
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
CollabRef(
￿
￿)
ClarkGame
square(a)
solid(a)
sandybrown(a)
square(
￿
￿)
C: Yeah. addcr(
￿
￿,
￿
￿ sandybrown)
CollabRef(
￿
￿)
Clarify(
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
CollabRef(
￿
￿)
ClarkGame
square(a)
solid(a)
sandybrown(a)
square(
￿
￿)
￿
￿ sandybrown
C: It’s solid.
(tacit) Pop(CollabRef(
￿
￿))
(tacit) Pop(Clarify(C
￿,
￿
￿))
(tacit) Reinstate(
￿
￿)
addcr(
￿
￿,solid(
￿
￿))
CollabRef(
￿
￿)
ClarkGame
square(a)
solid(a)
sandybrown(a)
square(
￿
￿)
￿
￿ sandybrown
sandybrown(
￿
￿)
solid(
￿
￿)
U: [Action]
(tacit) Pop(CollabRef(
￿
￿))
place(a)
ClarkGame
square(a)
solid(a)
sandybrown(a)
square(
￿
￿)
￿
￿ sandybrown
sandybrown(
￿
￿)
solid(
￿
￿)
Figure 2: A trace of task actions and task states through which COREF represents and
participates in the interaction of (9).
23Enlightened update and E-presupposition
Enlightened update is suggested as a replacement for the common ground
pragmatics for presuppostion.
(5) Common ground/compositional architecture
A. Notion of speaker’s presupposition as a constraint on common
ground.
B. Independent encoding of semantic presuppositions in semantic
values with truth value gaps or deﬁnedness of information-increment
functions.
C. Piece of pragmatic logic by which an utterance semantic presup-
position in the sense of B is a pragmatic presupposition in the
sense of A. (Stalnaker’s Bridge)
(6) At a couple of junctures the paper assumes that the grammar speciﬁes
a link to a common ground in a common ground analysis of presup-
position. This is conceivable, but we don’t take it to be the standard
formulation.
[ASS [S ... ] ]
ASS has an indexical semantics referring to the propositional CG com-
ponent of a context of utterance.
(7) If the reference to CG is introduced pragmatically, it’s easy to substi-
tute something else.
A’. Notion of speaker’s E-presupposition as a constraint on the speaker’s
private discourse state ˆ c.
B’. Independent encoding of semantic presuppositions in semantic
values with truth value gaps or deﬁnedness of information-increment
functions.
C’. Piece of pragmatic logic by which an utterance semantic presup-
position in the sense of B is a E-presupposition in the sense of
A’.
The term E-presuppostion refers to enlightened. It’s a kind of presuppostion
which constrains a planning attitude of the speaker, rather than the common
ground.
Preconditions and presuppositions
(8) Cooking example (p. 16)
a. Andrew and Bess are preparing dinner.
b. Bess asks Andrew to wash the spinach for the salad.
3c. She turns away to attent to the stove.
d. Andrew washes the spinach unobserved. (Private action)
e. Bess turns around again.
f. Andrew mixes the spinach with the rest of the salad ingredients.
(Public action.)
g. Bess infers that the salad has been washed, and this becomes
mutual information.
(9) a. In Andrew and Bess’s plans, washing the spinach is a precondition
for mixing it with the other salad ingredients.
b. Precondition is a technical term of the theory of action and plan-
ning.
c. In some everyday sense, mixing the spinach into the salad pre-
supposes having washed it.
d. But given a background premise that Andrew would mix in the
spinach only if he has washed it, that he has washed the spinach
is a logical consequence of his having mixed it into the salad.
e. Maybe something similar is true of enlightened update.
The case for something like the planning architecture seems good, both in
verbal and non-verbal action:
(10) B needs to go somewhere.
A: Why don’t you borrow my bike?
A hands B a key.
Implication: this is the key to the lock on my bike. (Abusch 2005)
(11)a. The speaker has silently formed a plan (represented in ˆ c) which in-
cludes the hearer to taking the key and unlock the bike with it.
b. Abstractly, the hearer recognizes the plan (including the information
that the key is a key to the bike lock) by decoding ˆ c from the set of
competitors Z(c).
The planning architecture is a great idea for pragmatics, but we think the
paper doesn’t make the case that it has anything to do with presupposition
in the linguistic sense.
(12) Consistent with the well-developed claims of the paper?
a. Private but publically recognizable speaker commitments play an
important role in the theories of action and dialogue, and in im-
plementations of them.
b. E-presuppositions have the status of preconditions for utterances.
4c. They have no connection with the semantic presuppositions of
linguistic semantics (the elements of meaning which come from
presupposition triggers, and are transformed by compositional
semantics).
d. The information gained in enlightened update has the status of a
conversational implicature, of the ordinary non-presuppositional
kind.
Holistic architecture
(13) a. Many sources of indeterminacy:
Syntactic ambiguity
Anaphora resolution
Covert actions of speaker
Uncertainty about initial common ground
...
b. These result in a bunch of possibilities for the discourse structure
associated with a given utterance.
c. Pragmatics (and speciﬁcally the utterance planning algorithm)
exploit an holistic ranking of possible discourse structures.
Abduction is inference to the best overall explana-
tion, taking all the data into account. This methodology
requires a holistic approach to pragmatic reasoning. Dis-
parate pragmatic phenomena, such as disambiguation,
anaphora resolution, and implicature detection, must be
considered together to produce an overall preference for a
single, best interpretation in the reasoning process that
leads from a contextualized utterance to an update of
interlocutors’ information.
d. Stated in terms of abductive proof.
(14) Presumably holism doesn’t require the architecture for grammar and
pragmatics to be non-modular at the symbolic level.
(15) a. It is hard to work with the holistic architecture with paper and
pencil, because there are no short pragmatic proofs.
Gricean pragmatist: I don’t see that your theory makes any pre-
diction one way or the other about this example. My theory
predicts such-and-such a reading for the discourse because of the
proof on the blackboard. (It’s the wrong reading, but at least
I’ve got the right kind of theory.)
Enlightened pragmatist: Actually it works out ok with our num-
bers.
5Gricean pragmatist: Great, but I’m no wiser.
b. We nevertheless share the hunch that pragmatics needs to exploit
a measure of overall plausibility of competing scenarios, perhaps
with a non-symbolic component.
c. To make predictions, the holistic architecture requires computa-
tional modeling.
(16) a. Speaker’s utterance planning uses modeling of the hearer’s interpretation-
preference function. (In the simplest model it’s the same as the
speaker’s function.)
b. Speaker plans an utterance whose optimal discourse parse accord-
ing to the hearer’s preference function includes his internal state
ˆ c.
c. This works also if the preference criteria are non-symbolic, e.g.
use numerical criteria trained from experience and/or reﬂecting
subsymbolic cognition.
(17) a. Connection with interpretations according to which hearers are
able to resolve ambigous deﬁnite reference in visually presented
environments by virtue of alignment with the attentional state of
the speaker.
b. Environment with objects being manipulated by one participant
under the instruction of the other. There are numerous cubes.
Pick up the cube.
Michael Tanenhaus (2005) Referential domains in spoken lan-
guage comprehension: using eye movements to bridge the product
and action traditions.
c. In eﬀect, the symbolic reasoning components for both speakers
exploit the same most-salient-referent oracle.
(18) When communication works, it can be hard to distinguish an optimally
planning speaker from a solipsistic speaker who makes stray statements
reﬂecting his internal state, relying on the hearer to ﬁgure out what
he must or should intend. Probably in reality, there is a mixture of
the two, or a continuum between them.
Novel presuppostions
(19) Does E-presupposition generalize CG-presupposition?
a. ˆ c = c + information about speaker’s covert actions
6b. If c satisﬁes the presuppositions of φ, then so does ˆ c.
In this sense E-presupposition generalizes CG-presupposition. Pre-
suppositions can be satisﬁed by information in the CG c, but also
by information in the internal state ˆ c which is not in c.
c. But because of indexical information in the state, the update is
not informationally monotonic. Maybe for propositional informa-
tion, the reasoning works.
(20) a. The paper points out that the planning architecture opens up
some space between the CG and the information state where se-
mantic presuppositions are checked.
b. In covert action, the speaker forms an intention to refer to his
cat, so ˆ c has information about the speaker’s cat which c lacks.
c. Presupposition of I’ve got to pick up my cat at the vet is satisﬁed.
d. This is okay, but it doesn’t provide any speciﬁc motivation for the
architecture. If the speaker can form any intention, any accom-
modation goes.
(21) a. It would be good to start with to show that presuppostions can
be satisﬁed by information in independently motivated covert ac-
tions.
b. c + info about covert actions + φ
(22)a. We’re out of milk.
b. The store is on the corner. (A nearby store where I intend for you to
buy milk.)
c. The money is on the table.
These are like the examples in Frazier’s paper, except that what prompts the
small world is in ˆ c rather than earlier linguistic material.
(23)a. I’m out of money. / It’s a beautiful day.
b. I won’t ask you for a loan again.
(24)a. It’s rather far to the store.
b. ? The bike is in the garage. (The one I indend for you to use.)
(25)a. I {going to/want to} buy a motorcycle.
b. I won’t ask you for loan again.
(26)a. I {going to/want to} make steaks for dinner.
b. The store is on the corner.
7Accommodation theorems?
(27) A: I request that you turn down your radio.
Theorem of action theory: If A declares that he requests that B turn
down his radio, then A does request that B turn down his radio.
Performatives in a Rationally Based Speech Act Theory. Philip R.
Cohen, Hector J. Levesque (1990).
(28) Under such and such circumstances, A asserting the sentence φ with
presuppostion pres(φ), is equivalent in its eﬀects to A asserting pres(φ)∧
φ).
8